Canonical and Civil Matrimonial Actions: A Comparison by Msgr. Marion J. Reinhardt
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 12 
Number 1 Volume 12, Winter 1966, Number 1 Article 3 
November 2016 
Canonical and Civil Matrimonial Actions: A Comparison 
Msgr. Marion J. Reinhardt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Msgr. Marion J. Reinhardt (1966) "Canonical and Civil Matrimonial Actions: A Comparison," The Catholic 
Lawyer: Vol. 12 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol12/iss1/3 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
CANONICAL AND CIVIL
MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS:
A COMPARISON
MSGR. MARION J. REINHARDT*
T HIS PAPER WILL COMPARE the canonical matrimonial action with
matrimonial actions in the secular courts of our country. Men-
tion will be made frequently of the statutes and common law of the
State of New York. This will permit a more precise description of
the correlation between the two systems. At the same time it is felt
that the law of New York is representative of law of the other
states at least as far as the various points to be discussed are
concerned.
When the American colonies adopted the common law of England,
neither the court of law nor the court of equity in England had juris-
diction over marriage. Marriage jurisdiction was in the Anglican
ecclesiastical courts which had inherited it from the Catholic tribunals
at the time of the Reformation. Our early courts, therefore, considered
themselves as having no jurisdiction over matrimonial matters. Such
jurisdiction over the subject matter of marriage eventually was granted
by statute. In many cases the state legislatures granting such jurisdiction,
must have looked to the Anglican ecclesiastical courts for some guid-
ance. The similarity is so great that it could hardly otherwise be
explained.
A good example of similarity is found in the definition of marriage.
Section 10 of the New York Domestic Relations Law states: "Marriage,
so far as its validity is concerned, continues to be a civil contract, to
which the consent of the parties capable in law of making a contract
is essential." Canon 1081, Section 1, states: " Marriage is effected by
the consent of the parties lawfully expressed between persons who are
capable according to law; and this consent no human power can supply."
Both laws agree that marriage is a contract, that it comes into
existence by the consent of the parties, and that the parties must have
the legal capacity to contract. The New York law adds that it is a
civil contract, but it does not deny any religious significance which the
contract might have for individuals. As a matter of fact, provision is
made for the celebration of the marriage by duly ordained ministers or
clergymen affiliated with any religion which is listed in the most recent
* Presiding Judge, Tribunal of the Diocese of Brooklyn.
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federal census of religious bodies.
The statute in New York does not
specify the terms to which the parties
must agree. Case law in New York indi-
cates that the contract is between one man
and one woman, that they contract to live
together as husband and wife with the
object of constituting a family, for the
preservation of moral and social purity,
for the continuance of the race, for family
welfare, and for the general good of
society.
Canon 1081, Section 2, of the Code
of Canon Law, spells out in detail the
terms of the marriage contract: "Matri-
monial consent is an act of the will by
which each party gives and accepts a per-
petual and exclusive right over the body,
for acts which arc of themselves suitable
for the generation of children." In canon
law, the obligations to live together and
to provide for the education of the child-
ren are considered effects which follow
from the primary obligations of marriage,
rather than terms of the contract. They
do not affect the validity.
According to canon law, the right with
the corresponding obligation to the con-
jugal act is the main term of the contract.
Indissolubility and fidelity are considered
essential properties of the conjugal rights,
i.e., so joined to the conjugal rights that
they cannot be excluded from the consent.
If the right to the conjugal act is excluded,
or if the indissolubility or fidelity is ex-
cluded, the marriage is null and void.
This is true if the exclusion is done in
good faith, deliberately, fraudulently, or
even with the consent of both parties.
There is no such thing in canon law as
consent by estoppel as far as marriage is
concerned. If the right to the conjugal act,
or to an essential property either of indis-
solubility or of fidelity is excluded, the
marriage is null. When a canonist speaks
of nullity in regard to marriage, he means
null and void "ab initio," and the marriage
can only be made valid by a new exchange
of vows according to the canons. No
passing of time will cause a marriage to
be canonically valid which originally was
invalid when contracted. There is no
statute of limitations for matrimonial
actions in canon law.
The necessity of a new solemnization
of marriage, a new exchange of marriage
vows before an authorized priest, when a
marriage is null and void in canon law,
is similar to the situation in New York
law when a marriage is void "ab initio,"
e.g., an incestuous marriage between sister
and brother, father and daughter, uncle
and niece, or a marriage where one of the
parties has a prior spouse living and un-
divorced. In New York law, the continu-
ing to live in a bigamous marriage after
the death of the prior lawful spouse does
not cause the bigamous marriage to be-
come valid-a new marriage ceremony is
needed. The same is true for all the
invalidating causes in canon law, both
lack of consent and invalidating impedi-
ments; a new canonical exchange of mari-
tal consent is necessary after the cessation
of the invalidating cause. This is quite dif-
ferent from voidable marriages in New
York law which are no longer voidable
after they have been ratified by a failure
to bring an action of nullity.
A difficult situation arises when a
spouse has given invalid consent accord-
ing to canon law, but the proof of the
invalidity is not available. The marriage
is definitely null and void, but because of
the occult nature of the invalidity, proper
consent can be given privately, i.e., with-
out a new public solemnization of the
marriage. The same solution is available
when there is an impediment which is
dispensable, but occilt because it cannot
be proved. After a dispensation is granted,
consent can be renewed privately but the
consent is necessary for canonical validity
even in the internal forum of conscience.
in our secular courts, equity has the
principle that a plaintiff' may not come
irito court with "unclean hands." Undoubt-
edly,' this came from the influence of the
clerical chancellor at the King's court. In
marriage cases, the Code of Canon Law
provides that the person who is the direct
and' culpable 'cause of the nullity cannot
bring the action. This does not mean that
the Church will consider the marriage as
valid if it is actually null and void. Some-
times the innocent party will be the plain-
tiff. Sometimes, the Promoter of Justice,
whose duties resemble those of a district
attorney, will act as plaintiff. The Church
frequently dispenses from the incapacity
caused by "unclean hands" if the plaintiff
is now repentant.
Both canon law and the law of the
State of New York hold that a marriage
is contracted by 'consent; that subsequent
consummation is not required for the
validity of the contract. In canon law
nonh-consummation permits a dissolution
or a breaking of the bond. In New York
law non-consummation by itself does not
give rise either to a divorce or to a decree
of nullity, but there could easily arise an
action of nillity for prior fraud. The
New York courts also are more inclined to
find other- grounds if a marriage has not
been physically consummated. Consumma-
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tion in canon law requires both some pene-
tration and.some insemination. Mere pres-
sure against the female membrane together
with insemination is not sufficient as some
criminal courts have held in cases of rape.
The New York common law on con-
tracts recognizes as valid a contract made
by one who even at the time has no
expectation or hope of fulfilling it. One
having no present interest therein could
contract to sell the Empire State Building.
The contract could be considered binding
and the failure to give title would give an
action for breach of contract. This concept
of being able to contract to do what one
is actually unable to do seems to have
had its influence on the Domestic Rela-
tions Law on the contract of marriage. In
New York law, physical impotence either
on the part of the male or on the part of
the female does not of itself cause nullity.
New York cases impose a positive obliga-
tion to reveal such a condition, and
failure to do so can give rise to an action
of nullity for fraud. If no action is
brought, the marriage continues to be
valid. The New York Domestic Relations
Law also permits an action to be brought
within five years after the marriage on the
grounds of physical incapacity. The statute
specifies that the marriage is null from
the time its nullity is declared. Again, if
no action is brought within the period of
the statute of limitations, the marriage
continues to be considered valid.
Canon law, at least as far as the mar-
riage contract is concerned, takes the atti-
tude that a person cannot contract to do
what he is incapable of doing. A male
or a -female lacking the necessary organs
for 'copulation cannot validly contract to
marry. Impotence, therefore, causes a
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marriage to be invalid as long as it is
antecedent and perpetual.
A recent Rota case found that the mar-
riage of a nymphomaniac was null and
void because the wife, inflicted with nym-
phomania, was incapable of fulfilling the
essential property of fidelity. Nympho-
mania is a feminine disease characterized
by a morbid and uncontrollable sexual
desire. This case appears to be another
application of the general principle that
one cannot give valid consent to do what
he is incapable of doing. This case of the
nymphomaniac seems to be a case of first
impression. Might it not be possible to
find additional applications of this prin-
ciple? Is it possible that a homosexual
might be capable of consummating a mar-
riage once or a few times but incapable
of giving "perpetual rights"?
Canon law has the impediments of non-
age, consanguinity and prior marriage as
does New York State law. The age of
consent in canon law is 16 years for the
male and 14 for the female. In canon law,
continuing to cohabit after age of consent
does not cause the marriage to become
valid. As an impediment, consanguinity
is extended to all marriages between ances-
tors and descendants; for other relatives,
up to the degree of second cousins. A
dispensation is not possible to permit
ancestors and descendants, or brothers and,
sisters to marry; for serious reasons uncle
and niece have been dispensed, but such
a dispensation is discouraged because of
conflict with the New York law. In canon
law, for a prior marriage to be an impedi-
ment, the marriage must have been valid
according to canon law; the fact that a
civil divorce or a civil annulment has
been obtained does not cause the prior
marriage to cease to be an impediment.
Force and fear, also called duress, cause
a marriage to be canonically null and void.
As in the civil law, the duress must be
grave, unjust and incurred from without.
There are other canonical impediments
still found in canon law which no longer
exist in New York law, e.g., affinity,
crime of adultery or murder, and seduc-
tion; still others are especially religious in
character, e.g., the spiritual relationship
between a baptized and a non-baptized
person; between a godfather or the one
baptizing and the person baptized.
A special word is in order concerning
the effect of fraud on the marriage con-
tract. In the New York courts, fraud is
undoubtedly the most common ground for
a decree of nullity. An action for annul-
ment because of fraud "in the inducement"
is provided by New York statutes, but
generally, the equity powers of the court
are considered to permit a similar action.
The fraud must concern the "essentials"
of the marriage to constitute grounds for
annulment.
Canonically, fraud does not have the
effect of nullity, unless it is fraud "in the
execution." There are two instances when
error can cause a marriage to be canon-
ically void: error about the identity of
the person; and error about a condition
of slavery. Both of these are very rare
in our day.
Both ecclesiastical law and secular law
hold that marriage is indissoluble, but for
neither is this indissolubility absolute.
New York law permits divorce in the case
of adultery and most other states have
additional grounds. From a canonist's
point of view, the voiding of a voidable
marriage in secular law differs little from
a divorce. Canon law permits the dis-
solution of a marriage (1) which has not
been consummated physically, and (2)
where at least one of the parties has re-
mained unbaptized during the entire time
of cohabitation. This latter dissolution is
in the interest of a convert or for the
preservation of the faith of a member of
the Church. Both canon law and Ameri-
can civil law agree that such divorces or
dissolutions can only be granted validly
by the respective public authority, the
Church or the state, but canon law has
an interesting exception even to this rule.
In the privilege granted by St. Paul, which
is restricted to the case where both par-
ties were unbaptized at the time of the
marriage, the convert could contract a new
valid marriage without the intervention of
ecclesiastical authority provided that he
verified the "departure" of the one who
remained unbaptized. Ordinarily, how-
ever, the priest assisting at the new mar-
riage would require that the conditions
necessary for the use of the Pauline Privi-
lege be verified by ecclesiastical authority.
We turn now to adjective law. Every
diocesan court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of marriage-except for the
marriages of heads of states, including
governors. Where will the venue lie? The
action can always be instituted at the
situs of the contract. It can also be
brought in the diocese of the domicile or
quasi-domicile of the defendant, but not
in the forum of the plaintiff. However, a
wife almost always has a legal domicile
with her husband, with the result that a
husband can bring the action in his own
place of domicile. Canon law recognizes
the possibility of multiple domiciles. In
addition to domicile, canon law recognizes
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quasi-domicile. A quasi-domicle requires
actual residence with the intention of re-
maining the greater part of a year. To
avoid collusive suits, there are some re-
strictions on the bringing of an action in
the place of the quasi-domicile of the
defendant.
The court itself is obliged to consider
whether or not the venue is correct, and
on its own initiative it must dismiss the
complaint of nullity if the venue is incor-
rect. However, if the court is in error
about the venue, and if an objection is
not timely made, the objection cannot be
raised later.
The action of nullity is started by the
plaintiff's presenting to the competent
tribunal a bill of complaint of nullity,
called a libel. If the court concludes
either that the venue is not correct, or
that the facts alleged do not constitute a
cause of action, it must dismiss the ac-
tion. As a practical matter, many courts
will also dismiss the action if the plaintiff
shows no indication of being able to prove
the facts alleged. If the court concludes
that the venue is correct and that the
facts alleged do constitute a cause of
action, it will admit the libel to trial. This
is called the accepting of the libel. This
decree as to the sufficiency of the libel
seems to be final in canon law so that,
after the libel has been accepted, the trial
must proceed to its end unless the plaintiff
abandons or renounces the action by vol-
untary discontinuance. It seems that Sec-
tion 3211 of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules provides a better rule,
permitting the court to dismiss at any time
if the facts alleged do not state a cause
of action. Occasionally, in a canonical
court it happens that the original plead-
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ings state a cause of action, but when
the plaintiff himself appears in court and
explains the facts he alleged, it then be-
comes clear from his own admissions that
there is no cause of action. If " he ec-
clesiastical court could dismiss during the
trial on the ground that there was no
longer a cause of action, some useless
trials could be avoided. For the protection
of the individual's rights, an appeal to the
higher court from the decree of dismissal
could be provided.
Similar to federal practice, the canon-
ical summons issues from the court itself.
If the venue is correct, the summons can
be served on the parties even outside of
the territory of the court, if necessary.
The assistance of other tribunals can also
be requested for the serving of a sum-
mons elsewhere. The joinder of issue is
effected by the court in the presence of
the parties or their attorneys.
The canonical action is not a trial by
lay jurymen, but by a bench of three
priest-judges. The hearings are in priv-
ate. All three judges are not required to
be physically present for the hearing of
the testimony. The testimony can be tak-
en by a referee (auditor) who, unless he
is also a judge, is exclusively a referee
"to inquire and report," and not a referee
"to determine." The Presiding Judge or
the referee will propose the questions.
Neither the Defender of the Bond nor the
attorneys may interrogate the parties or
witnesses, but they may propose ques-
tions to be asked. All of the evidence
must be reduced to writing by a court
clerk, and the judges must form their
opinions from the written record. It is a
canonical principal that "What is not in
the record, does not exist,"
For a decision, the three judges meet;
they discuss the law and the facts. A
majority of two is sufficient for a decision.
The vote, however, is secret, and it can
never be determined whether the decision
was unanimous or split. One and only
one opinion of the court is written, and
it is signed by all three.
The secrecy as to the voting of the
judges, and the lack of a minority opin-
ion, is a limitation. A minority opinion
might encourage certain parties to appeal
when at present they do not. If the
parties know that an opinion was unan-
imous, they might be discouraged from
making useless appeals.
Rule 3212 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules permits a sum-
mary judgment only for the defense in a
matrimonial action. In canonical prac-
tice, summary judgment is available also
for the plaintiff for specified types of
cases, e.g., prior bond, disparity of wor-
ship, sacred order, solemn vow of chas-
tity, consanguinity, affinity or spiritual
relationship. It is not available for
grounds other than those specified by the
canon. Where summary judgment is per-
mitted, the nullity is evident by reason of
documents and simple affidavits. The de-
cision is given by one judge, usually the
Bishop himself, after he has consulted the
Defender of the Bond. There is no neces-
sary appeal by the Defender of the Bond.
If any serious question of law or of fact
arises, the case must be tried by the or-
dinary court of three judges.
The New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules restricts the use of the declaratory
judgment to judiciable controversies.
However, declaratory judgments are
available for the determination of certain
matrimonial rights. In these instances, a
declaratory judgment is proper even
though there is no "controversy" in the
sense that the action is not contested.
The Code of Canon Law also has restric-
tions on declaratory judgments-all judi-
cial processes must be controversies. To
avoid the possibility of an uncontested
matrimonial action in canon law, there is
always present the Defender of the Bond
to argue for the validity of the marriage.
There is one reason why an attorney is
not as important in a canonical matri-
monial trial as he is in the secular courts.
Canon 1618 permits the court, on its own
initiative, to call for documents and wit-
nesses, and to interrogate the parties and
witnesses whenever the action is concerned
with the salvation of souls. Certainly, the
outcome of a marriage trial can affect the
salvation of souls. The court can act in
the defense of the marriage bond. For
this reason it can be questioned whether
the office of the Defender of the Bond
warrants the time and skill of the man
power presently committed to the argu-
ment for the validity of the marriage.
There are four rules of evidence which
make it particularly difficult for the canon
law court to find for the plaintiff. The
first of these is that the parties to the suit
are disqualified as witnesses. The parties
are permitted to testify, and what they
say can be the basis on which the proof
is laid, but their testimony is not consid-
ered proof. This is the general rule.
There are indications in Rotal decisions
that some weight is given to the testimony
of the parties, but certainly the testimony
of the parties alone would never be suf-
ficient evidence to permit a court to de-
clare a marriage null. This rule, regard-
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ing the parties as totally disqualified, was
formerly the law of New York, but today
it is overruled by statute (Section 4512
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules).
The second rule of evidence is "One
witness is no witness." In other words,
the operative facts which cause invalidity
must be proved by the direct testimony
of two witnesses, other than the parties.
There are found in Rota cases a few ex-
ceptions to the "two witnesses" rule, es-
pecially in force and fear cases, because
the one using duress is accustomed to try
to hide his doing so. One witness with
very strong circumstantial evidence might
suffice in exceptional cases.
Thirdly, canon law gives a specific legal
presumption for the validity of a mar-
riage. In New York law, marriage also
has a presumption for its validity. But
presumptions differ in strength. The pre-
sumption for the validity of marriage in
canon law is somewhat similar to the pre-
sumption for the legitimacy of a child in
New York law. In Matter of Findlay,
the New York court said that the pre-
sumption of legitimacy will not fail "unless
common sense and reason are outraged
by the holding that it abides." Almost
the same thing might be said for the
presumption for the validity of marriage
in canon law.
Fourthly, in the canonical action, the
plaintiff must produce evidence which
makes it morally certain that the mar-
riage is invalid. Canonical moral certi-
tude is similar to the rule of evidence,
"beyond a reasonable doubt," which our
secular courts require in criminal trials.
When all of these rules are joined to-
gether, i.e., that there is a strong presump-
tion of law for the validity of the marriage,
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and that the operative facts must be
proved "beyond a reasonable doubt" by
at least two witnesses, other than the
parties themselves, it is evident that in
the canon law court the proof of nullity
of the marriage must be substantial.
The Church has held to these rigid
rules making it difficult to prove a mar-
riage invalid on the argument that the
public good is involved in marriage. New
York law also agrees that society has an
interest in every marriage, and in an un-
contested matrimonial action other con-
vincing proof is demanded, but the "fair
preponderance of credible evidence" rule
still remains. There is some desire for a
mitigation of the canonical rules of evi-
dence. It is argued that while it is true
the public order must be upheld, it is like-
wise true that there should be a greater
concern for the salvation of individual
souls. In urban society, public order is
not affected by decrees of nullity as in
rural society. One frequently does not
know the neighbors in the adjoining
apartment.
Another consideration is that of appeal.
If the court finds for the validity of the
marriage, the plaintiff may appeal. Ap-
peal is required by canon law if the court
has found for nullity. Some canonists to-
day would prefer a discretionary appeal
if the Defender is a qualified canonist.
With the exception of the cases which are
decided by summary judgment, an ec-
clesiastical decree of nullity does not
permit the plaintiff to remarry unless it
has been confirmed by a higher court. A
matrimonial action never becomes res
judicata, but if there are two conforming
opinions for nullity, the plaintiff may then
remarry. If subsequent evidence should
indicate that the conclusions of the courts
were not correct, the decree can be at-
tacked directly by appeal, even after the
lapse of a long period of time.
In a matrimonial action, the canonical
appeal court is principally concerned with
the sufficiency of the evidence. Generally,
the law is clear and unquestioned, but
there are exceptions. Reviewing the facts,
the appeal court looks at the evidence,
weighs it, and gives its findings of fact
just as if it were acting as the court of
trial. At least in the canons themselves,
there is no suggestion of the use of the
principle of "judicial restraint" based on
the consideration that the trial court would
be in a better position to estimate the
credibility of the witnesses and the im-
plications of their testimony. In other
words, the appeal court will substitute its
own discretion for the discretion of the
trial court without hesitation. When it re-
views the case in third instance, the
Sacred Roman Rota also will freely use
its own discretion, recognizing no obliga-
tion to agree or disagree either with the
trial court or with the intermediate ap-
peal court.
Another peculiarity of canonical prac-
tice is that the appeal court frequently
will reinterrogate the parties or witnesses,
or hear new witnesses. For this purpose
the case is not remanded to the trial
court as is the practice in our secular
courts. Remanding the case to the trial
court for additional testimony, and for
the giving of a new decision on all the
evidence including that which has been
added, might have its advantages. It
would instruct the trial court in better
methods of procedure, and it could fre-
quently avoid the necessity of cases going
to the higher levels of appeal. We might
also ask whether two courts actually have
given conforming opinions if some evi-
dence was considered and used by the
second court which was never before the
first court for its deliberations.
I One frequently hears it said that the
canonical court does not have the prin-
ciple of "stare decisis." This is true but
it does not, therefore, follow that the
lower courts are free to ignore the juris-
prudence of the higher courts, especially
that of the Sacred Roman Rota. Canon
20 of the Code specifies that when there
is no canonical directive about a par-
ticular point, the practice of the Roman
Curia must be considered. (The Rota is
part of the Roman Curia.) Secondly,
appeals are more common in the canon-
ical than in the secular court. Naturally,
the higher court will follow its own juris-
prudence when it decides the case on
appeal. Consequently, the trial court,
rendering a decision, will always bear in
mind the jurisprudence of the higher court.
Our comments so far have been con,
cerned almost exclusively with the sub-
stantive law of marriage, and with the use
of the ecclesiastical forum to clarify mar-
ital rights. Might the local ecclesiastical
court be used for other actions? At least
in theory, the answer must be affirmative.
As a matter of fact, there is a general
prohibition against summoning a cleric
before a civil court in any sort of an
action. Therefore,'a tort action or a con-
tract action against a priest should be in
the local ecclesiastical court, and the sub-
stantive law to be followed by the ecclesi-
astical court would be the prevailing
secular law, i.e., the common law, stat-
utes, principles of conflict of laws, etc. As
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a practical matter, it is better to obtain
permission from the local Bishop to use
the secular forum. The ecclesiastical
court would have to use its own adjective
law, i.e., the plaintiff would have the
burden of proving his case "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt"; the testimony of the par-
ties would not be evidence; the testimony
of the plaintiff's spouse or other close
relative would not be admissible as evi-
dence. Although it was given with the
utmost diligence and in the best of good
faith, the result in the ecclesiastical court
could easily be the opposite from that in
the secular court.
Canon 1552 states that the object of
the judicial process is the pursuing and
vindication of rights and the determination
of operative facts. We are all conscious
of the vital part played by our secular
court system in the matter of civil rights.
In our day, the ecclesiastical tribunal gen-
erally is not used for the vindication of
ecclesiastical rights, except in relation to
marriage. The Church finds, and rightly
so, that the administrative decision is
most expeditious and effective even in
contentious matters. But the history
of the Church indicates that all of its
members are human, and that error is
possible. It is my conviction that the
ecclesiastical tribunal should always be
available for judicial review, and for the
clarification and vindication of all ec-
clesiastical rights. Only the slower and
more deliberate judicial procedure, with
its safeguarding formalities and its rights
of appeal can be expected to provide
complete justice, especially when the facts
in issue are many and complex, or the
law is obscure.
